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Abstract: 
 
This paper addresses the question of how human science categories yield projectable inferences 
by critically examining Ron Mallon’s ‘social role’ account of human kinds. Mallon contends that 
human categories are projectable when a social role produces a homeostatic property cluster 
(HPC) kind. On this account, human categories are projectable when various social mechanisms 
stabilize and entrench those categories. Mallon’s analysis obscures a distinction between 
transitory and robust projectable inferences. I argue that the social kinds discussed by Mallon 
yield the former, while classifications of biological kinds yield the latter. Classifications from 
psychiatry (‘schizophrenia,’ ‘hysteria’) are discussed as examples.  
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1. Introduction  
In his excellent and provocative book, The Construction of Human Kinds, Ron Mallon (2016) 
attempts to demonstrate how social constructionism regarding human science classifications can 
be consistent with a broadly naturalist and realist metaphysics. In particular, he aims to show 
how socially constructed human categories or kinds (e.g., race, gender, homosexuality) can be 
real and causally predictive. Within this project, Mallon proffers an explanation for the 
projectability of socially constructed human categories, i.e., how human categories that are 
socially constructed can yield reliable inductive inferences about members of kind. On Mallon’s 
account, socially constructed categories are projectable when a ‘social role’ creates or produces a 
homeostatic property cluster (HPC) kind that is stabilized and entrenched by certain social 
mechanisms.  
 In this paper, I argue that Mallon’s social role account of the projectability of human kind 
categories obscures and fails to recognize a distinction between transitory and robust projectable 
inferences, and his account of socially constructed kinds can only explain the former. The more 
orthodox realist view that human science categories are projectable when such categories 
accurately individuate natural or biological kinds offers a more compelling explanation for the 
robust projectable inferences we can draw from certain human science categories (e.g., 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder). While the social kinds implied by Mallon’s social role account 
may yield reliable inductive inferences about members of a kind over small time-scales, for a 
human science classification to yield stable and robust projectable inferences over longer time-
scales, the classification must—at least partially—pick out a natural or biological kind.1 In 
                                                 
1 My argument presupposes the metaphysical assumption that cultural evolution moves faster than biological 
evolution. For critical discussion of evidence in favor of this assumption, see Richerson and Boyd (2005), 
Richerson, Boyd, and Henrich (2010), and Perreault (2012). 
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sections 3 and 4 of the paper, I argue that classifications of natural kinds yield robust and stable 
projectable inferences, while classifications of social kinds yield more transitory and unstable 
projectable inferences. In this framework, the projectable inferences associated with 
classifications of social kinds are contingent, while the inferences associated with classifications 
of natural kinds approach the philosophical ideal of necessity. I support this argument with 
examples of psychiatric kinds, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and hysteria. The robust 
and ampliative projectable inferences that we can draw from classifications like schizophrenia 
(e.g., psychosis can be treated with dopamine antagonist drugs) are explained by the fact that 
these classifications individuate natural kinds whose members share similar (intrinsic) biological 
properties. By contrast, classifications of purely social kinds, such as hysteria, yield more 
transitory projectable inferences. This implies that human and social sciences that aim to produce 
predictive human classifications (e.g., medicine, psychology, psychiatry) should classify natural 
kinds.2 The distinction between robust and transitory projectability also suggests that Mallon’s 
(2016) account of the projectability of human kinds could be fruitfully expanded by considering 
how socially constructed categories are sometimes partially constructed by natural properties that 
ground them, which is a possibility he is not unsympathetic to (210-13). Nothing in my analysis 
is intended to vitiate the idea that human science classifications are socially constructed relative 
to particular human interests, decisions, social practices, and historically-situated cultures. What 
it does suggest, as a corrective, is that despite such social constraints, some human classifications 
                                                 
2 My analysis is not intended to imply that the social role kinds discussed by Mallon are unworthy of study in the 
social sciences. What it does imply is that these classifications will not yield the robust and stable projectable 
inferences that classifications of natural kinds will. For social sciences that are less interested in making predictions 
and more interested in explaining and understanding human phenomena (e.g., sociology, anthropology), the 
investigation of social kinds can be extremely fruitful, especially in revealing the mechanisms involved in the 
stabilization and destabilization of these categories. Indeed, one of the major benefits of Mallon’s book is the 
illumination of such issues. 
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pick out (more or less) naturally-occurring classes (cf. Dupré 1993, 2001), which is ultimately 
responsible for the capacity to yield robust and stable projectable inferences.  
 
 
2. Mallon on the Projectability of Human Kinds 
Mallon’s account of the construction of human categories focuses on ‘social roles.’ According to 
Mallon (2016), social roles are structured by representations, i.e., “attitudes, theories, narratives, 
concepts, models pictures, norms, rules, utterances, inscriptions, and texts by which we represent 
the world and structure our actions” (6), whereas categories are what representations are about 
(e.g., properties or classes in the world), and human kinds are projectable categories that support 
inductive inferences, predictions, and explanation. In this framework, a social role exists if: (1) 
there are representations that pick out a category of persons and a set of beliefs and evaluations 
associated with that term, and (2) many of the beliefs and evaluations associated with the role are 
common knowledge within society. Condition (2) is achieved through the public broadcasting of 
information concerning the social role, e.g., by scientific institutions, media reports, or other 
credible sources.    
 For a social role to become a human kind, it is first necessary for the social role to 
become entrenched in society and culture. In this account, human kinds are not biological kinds 
(although they are often thought to be), but social kinds (‘social roles’) whose reality is 
constituted by the various representations and human practices that sustain and reinforce these 
roles.3 Mallon (2016) writes: 
                                                 
3 Throughout his book, Mallon (2016) makes it clear that the social roles he is discussing are covert social roles: 
social roles (e.g., race or gender) that are regarded as the product of natural facts, rather than human classificatory or 
social practices. His account maintains that although these categories are thought to be natural kinds, they are in 
reality social kinds (chs. 2, 3, 8, and 9). 
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[A] category (e.g., race or gender or dissociative identity disorder) may not be a 
biological kind, but it is not nothing either. It can be a real and important kind structured 
and sustained by the representations of the category, and by the accumulated [causal] 
effects of such representations. (93) 
The idea is that social roles can be entrenched by various mechanisms and human practices 
surrounding representations, which makes that social role a real and causally significant human 
kind (Mallon 2016: ch. 3). For example, Mallon suggests that looping effects (Hacking 1995) 
can serve to entrench a social role, when the emergence of a category (e.g., multiple personality) 
causes people—for strategic or non-strategic reasons—to act in accordance with the stereotypical 
features associated with that role. On this view, social roles are entrenched by both those who 
adopt a social role and by the people (e.g., doctors, psychiatrists, the public) who recognize and 
use the social role term in various social practices.4 The entrenchment of social roles may also be 
facilitated by human cognitive mechanisms, such as innate automatic psychological processes 
(e.g., tendencies towards essentialist thinking or grouping on the basis of stereotypes) or acquired 
psychological processes (e.g., automatic responses that are shaped and reinforced by culture). On 
a broader level, social roles can be entrenched by modifications to the social environment or 
culture (e.g., residential segregation in the United States, formal institutions specifying 
definitions for some category), which produce feedback to both social role representations and 
the people represented. All of these mechanisms—through their systematic causal effects—serve 
to entrench existing social roles, which structure the behavior and expectations for those who 
recognize and use the social role classification (e.g., psychiatrists, the public) and for those who 
fall under the classification (e.g., an individual diagnosed with a mental disorder).  
                                                 
4 Whereas Mallon focuses how looping effects stabilize a social role, Hacking (1999; 2007) also emphasizes how 
looping effects can destabilize human kind classifications (cf. Mallon 2016: ch. 7). 
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Mallon argues that when social roles become entrenched via various social mechanisms, 
these human categories are transformed into human kinds that yield projectable inductive 
inferences. As Mallon (2016) puts it: “I argue that … social roles categories can be human kinds 
… that support induction, prediction, explanation, and intervention in some or another of our 
inductive projects … by arguing that the kinds amount to homeostatic property-cluster kinds” 
(89, emphasis in original). In Mallon’s account, entrenched social roles or human kinds are 
accurately described by what Richard Boyd (1991, 1999a) calls homeostatic property cluster 
kinds or HPC kinds. Boyd’s account of HPC kinds is a non-essentialist theory of natural kinds, in 
which members of a kind share a cluster of similar properties, but no property is essential for 
membership in a kind. According to Boyd (1999a: 143-144), the key characteristics of HPC 
kinds are the following: 
(1) There is a family of properties (F) that are contingently clustered in nature. 
(2) Their co-occurrence is the result of what may be described as homeostasis: either the 
presence of some properties tends to favor the presence of others, or there are 
underlying mechanisms that tend to maintain the properties in F, or both. 
(3) There is a kind term (t) that is applied to things in which the homeostatic clustering of 
most of the properties in F occurs. 
Unlike essentialist natural kinds that are defined by necessary and sufficient conditions (e.g., 
H20, electrons), HPC kinds refer to the messier kinds of classes that are studied in the biological 
and human sciences (e.g., species, diseases). Boyd’s HPC account of natural kinds is motivated 
in large part to explain the projectability of non-essentialist natural kind classifications. On this 
account, it is the shared, law-like causal structure—i.e., the homeostatic mechanisms referred to 
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in (2) that cause properties to cluster in a regular and non-accidental way— that allows for 
successful inductive inferences about members of a kind (Boyd 1985, 1991, 1999a, 2010).5  
Mallon finds Boyd’s account of HPC kinds apt for characterizing entrenched social roles 
because it is sufficiently liberal to account for the non-essentialist nature of human social roles or 
categories. For Mallon, it is particularly significant that the HPC account liberalizes the types of 
properties that can be included in the property cluster in (1) to include relational properties, in 
addition to intrinsic ones (cf. Boyd 1991: 140-143), which “opens the door to properties that 
result from human practices, norms, conventions, and so forth” (Mallon 2016: 92). That is, the 
HPC account can accommodate clusters of social properties that result from the sorts of social, 
psychological, and environmental mechanisms that Mallon suggests sustain and entrench social 
roles. If entrenched social roles (or human kinds) are accurately characterized as HPC kinds, then 
this could explain the projectability of human kinds. Mallon (2016) writes:  
[C]ausally significant social roles … could figure as the homeostatic mechanism at the 
center of important property cluster-kinds that structure our social world. Of course, 
whether a particular type of social role does constitute an explanatory kind is an empirical 
question, but social roles that do produce and sustain property-cluster kinds may support 
induction, prediction, and explanation. (92, emphasis added) 
Mallon’s account of how a social role is supposed to produce an HPC kind is somewhat murky, 
but the basic idea is that human kind terms are projectable insofar as the property clusters 
associated with these terms are sustained by reiterated representations of a social role and 
mechanisms (e.g., social feedback mechanisms, psychological mechanisms, environmental 
                                                 
5 Craver (2009) and Khalidi (2013) argue that the HPC theory could dispense with the homeostatic mechanisms 
requirement, but both agree with the general realist argument advanced in this paper that the kind term needs to 
correctly describe the causal structure of the world to offer projectable inferences (cf. Slater 2015). 
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mechanisms) that serve to entrench that social role. Part of the unclarity in this account may be 
due to the fact that Mallon (2016) only offers his account as a “how-possibly” (89) model of how 
socially constructed human kinds are projectable. That is, Mallon’s account is only intended to 
articulate the general conditions that need to be met for a human kind classification to be 
projectable (viz., the production of an HPC kind), and his argument is that entrenched social 
roles can meet these conditions.  
In sections 3 and 4 of this paper, I argue that a condition that is neglected in Mallon’s 
account is that some of the properties in the property cluster individuated by an HPC kind term 
must be intrinsic or natural (e.g., biological). I suggest that this condition must be met for an 
HPC kind term to yield the sort of non-trivial, robust projectable inferences typically demanded 
of scientific classifications. Mallon’s account of the projectability of human kinds rests on the 
idea that social roles, when entrenched by various mechanisms, can produce an HPC kind. It is 
important to notice that the relevant HPC kinds in Mallon’s account are social kinds and the 
proper referents for human kinds are social constructs (see Mallon 2016, ch. 8; cf. Haslanger 
2012, ch. 3). Mallon (2016) briefly contrasts his social role account of human kinds with a realist 
account that holds that some “human categories are caused by or constituted by or 
metaphysically grounded in natural kinds—especially biological or medical kinds—that do not 
necessarily involve human mental states, decisions, culture, or social practices” (207). I contend 
that this realist account of human kinds, which maintains that human science classifications that 
refer to natural kinds yield projectable inferences, offers a superior explanation for the 
projectability of some human science classifications (e.g., ‘schizophrenia,’ ‘depression’). 
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3. Biological Kinds Yield Robust Projectable Inferences  
In arguing that classifications of natural kinds yield robust and stable projectable inferences, I 
adopt a realist position about natural kinds. Mallon (2016) contrasts his social constructionist 
position for understanding human categories to an alternative realist view that maintains that 
some human classifications are constituted by natural kinds, especially biological kinds (207). 
Compared to the more qualified version of realism (‘basic realism’) endorsed by Mallon (2016, 
ch. 6), this more orthodox realist position—which maintains that constructed classifications that 
individuate natural kinds are projectable—provides a superior explanation for the robust and 
ampliative projectable inferences yielded by some human science classifications. On this view, 
human science classifications of natural kinds yield robust and stable projectable because they 
individuate classes underwritten by a stable set of natural (e.g., biological) properties shared by 
members of a class. In terms of Mallon’s discussion of HPC kinds, this amounts to the claim that 
at least some of the mechanisms that maintain HPC kinds are intrinsic or natural (e.g., biological) 
properties of the kind in question. 
While Mallon’s social role account implies that purely social kinds (e.g., gender) 
constituted exclusively by relational properties can yield reliable projectable inferences, there are 
reasons for thinking that there is a significant difference between the projectable inferences 
produced by classifications of natural kinds versus social kinds. First, notice that we normally do 
not expect classifications of purely social kinds (e.g., ‘teachers,’ ‘liberals,’ ‘widows’) to yield 
any ampliative projectable inferences in the long term. These categories are recognized to be 
purely conventional classes, and we do not expect them to yield any scientifically interesting 
kinds of inferences. Most of the reliable inferences that can be drawn from these classifications 
are implied, directly or indirectly, by the definition of the classification (e.g., teachers will be 
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educated, widows are women), and hence, such inferences are non-ampliative. While social 
kinds can undoubtedly sometimes produce relatively stable ampliative predictions (e.g., teachers 
are less likely to be incarcerated), the social mechanisms that underwrite these predictions are 
subject to change as the social world evolves. By contrast, we expect human science 
classifications of natural kinds (e.g., ‘PKU,’ ‘schizophrenia’) to yield ampliative and stable 
projectable inferences. Classifications of natural kinds yield robust and stable projectable 
inferences because these classes are assumed to be underwritten by stable natural (e.g., 
biological) mechanisms.6 Classifications of purely social kinds, by contrast, are assumed to be 
underwritten by much less stable social mechanisms (e.g., broadcasting of social roles, adoption 
of social roles, imitation of stereotypes). Due to this difference regarding the mechanisms that 
underwrite these classifications, classifications of purely social kinds yield transitory projectable 
inferences relative to classifications of natural kinds. 
The account of natural kinds outlined above draws on a venerable philosophical tradition  
that regards members of a natural kind as sharing some natural (intrinsic) properties (Hacking 
1991). On this traditional understanding, natural kinds possess the following features (Bird and 
Tobin, 2018): 
1) Members of a natural kind should have some natural properties in common. 
2) Natural kinds should permit inductive inferences. 
3) Natural kinds should participate in laws of nature.  
                                                 
6 This view articulated herein draws on an argument I have made elsewhere (Tsou 2013, 2016) that some psychiatric 
disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, depression) are aptly described as what Kendler, Zachar, and Craver (2011) call 
mechanistic property cluster (MPC) kinds: kinds constituted by biological mechanisms at multiple levels (e.g., 
molecular, developmental, neurobiological) that interact to produce the key features of the kind. The MPC kind 
account can explain the projectability of kind terms by appeal to the regular and non-accidental (law-like) intrinsic 
properties shared by members of kind. For a broader and discussion of the projectability of psychological and 
psychiatric categories in connection with natural kinds, see Fodor (1974), Kim (1992), Block (1997), Griffiths, 
(1997, 1999, 2001), Millikan (1999), Antony (2003), Godman (2013), Khalidi (2013), and Zachar (2008). 
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Essentialist accounts maintain that natural kinds yield projectable inferences (2) because 
members of a natural kind share some intrinsic (natural) properties in common (1) that 
participate in laws in nature (3). Unlike essentialist accounts of natural kinds, which identify the 
natural properties in (1) with essential properties, Boyd’s HPC account maintains that HPC kinds 
yield projectable inferences (2) because members of HPC kinds share a family of properties (1) 
that cluster in a regular and non-accidental (law-like) manner because of homeostatic 
mechanisms (3). Mallon’s strategy for explaining the projectability of human kinds is to maintain 
that entrenched social roles (e.g., gender) can produce HPC kinds, and entrenched social roles 
share a family of social properties (1), which cluster in a regular and non-accidental manner 
because of homeostatic (e.g., social and environmental) mechanisms (3). Can these relational 
(social) properties ground the projectability of HPC kinds in the same way that intrinsic (natural) 
properties do? Ian Hacking has offered an influential argument for answering this question 
negatively. Hacking (1991, 1995) argues that the kinds (‘human kinds’) that are studied in the 
social sciences are fundamentally different from the traditional conception of natural kinds 
insofar as they are constituted by social properties. Compared to the stable natural properties that 
constitute natural kinds, Hacking (1995, 1999, 2007) argues that the social properties that 
constitute human kinds are inherently unstable because of the looping effects of human kinds. 
Looping effects are social feedback effects distinctive to the social sciences, wherein the 
meaning of a human science classification (e.g., ‘multiple personality’) changes the experiences 
and behaviors of classified people in unpredictable ways, thereby requiring revisions to the 
classification. Because looping effects constantly change the social properties that are utilized to 
identify members of a human kind, Hacking argues that the objects of human science 
classifications are ‘moving targets’ and, hence, their classifications will not yield stable 
12 
 
projectable inferences (Hacking 1999: 108; Hacking 2007). While I have argued against the 
generality of Hacking’s conclusions elsewhere,7 I agree with his claim that socially determined 
properties are not sufficiently stable to ground robust projectable inferences. The idea that the 
projectability of kind terms stems from stable properties is also amenable to James Woodward’s 
(2000) argument that generalizations that are explanatory in the special sciences are moderately 
invariant under various interventions. For Woodward, a generalization is invariant (or stable) 
insofar as it would continue hold as other variables or background conditions change. Within 
Woodward’s framework, robust projectable inferences can be understood as generalizations that 
remain invariant under a wide domain of interventions and background (e.g., social or historical) 
conditions. Below, I argue that Mallon’s social kinds do not yield projectable generalizations of 
this sort. 
The framework outlined above suggests that there is a meaningful epistemological 
distinction between the projectable inferences yielded by classifications of social kinds compared 
to classifications of natural kinds. Classifications of social kinds yield transitory and unstable 
projectable inferences, while classifications of natural kinds yield robust and stable projectable 
inferences. This difference can be summarized by stating that the projectable inferences drawn 
from classifications of social kinds will be contingent, while the projectable inferences drawn 
from classifications of natural kinds will at least approach the philosophical ideal of necessity. 
While I present this distinction as a difference in kind, I regard it as a difference of degree, based 
on the assumption that social and cultural evolution moves at a much faster pace than biological 
evolution (see note 1). From this perspective, consider Mallon’s paradigm examples of social 
                                                 
7 Against Hacking, I argue that the targets of some human science classifications (e.g., schizophrenia, depression) 
are stable despite of the social feedback associated with their classifications (Tsou 2007, 2013, 2016). In accordance 
with the argument articulated in this paper, I maintain that the targets of human science classifications are stable 
(and yield projectable inferences) precisely when they are natural kinds constituted by intrinsic biological properties. 
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kinds: race and gender. What kinds of ampliative projectable inferences can be drawn from these 
categories? Mallon is especially interested in how these socially constructed categories can yield 
projectable inferences related to oppression. In that light, one could argue that there are reliable 
and ampliative inferences related to oppression that we can currently draw from these categories. 
For instance, African Americans are more likely to be pulled over by the police in the United 
States, or women are more likely to spend time on household activities than men. The analysis of 
this paper suggests that these projectable inferences, if they are in fact predictively valid, are 
contingent. They are contingent insofar as the social forces involved in stabilizing these 
generalizations (e.g., racism, patriarchy) are historically contingent and subject to change. 
Moreover, these generalizations will not be invariant (or will have a limited domain of 
invariance) in Woodward’s sense insofar as they will not remain stable in different social 
contexts (e.g., in equitable societies). For philosophers interested in social change, it should be 
regarded as a good thing that these sorts of projectable inferences are neither necessary nor 
stable. The analysis articulated herein suggests that even deeply entrenched social mechanisms 
can be subject to change. By contrast, projectable inferences associated with classifications of 
natural kinds (e.g., ‘PKU,’ ‘introversion,’ ‘schizophrenia’) are necessary, or at least, approaching 
the philosophical ideal of necessity insofar as the biological mechanisms underwriting these 
categories remain stable over relatively long evolutionary time scales. The distinction between 
transitory and robust projectable inferences articulated above is not intended to be controversial. 
It is meant to point to a fundamental (perhaps trivial) distinction that is presupposed in some 
human and social sciences (e.g., medicine, psychology, psychiatry) that assume that the proper 
objects of scientific classification are natural kinds, and not social kinds.8 
                                                 
8 In presenting this work, discussants have either regarded the distinction between transitory and robust 
projectability to be either uncontroversial and trivially correct, or highly problematic. For those who oppose this 
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My analysis suggests that while Mallon may have shown that classifications of social 
kinds or social constructs can yield transitory projectable inferences, he has not demonstrated 
that they can yield the robust and stable projectable inferences that are demanded of predictive 
scientific classifications. In order to yield robust and stable projectable inferences, a human 
classification needs to—at least partially—individuate a natural kind underwritten by stable 
biological mechanisms. In terms of Mallon’s discussion of HPC kinds, this amounts to the claim 
that some of the mechanisms that maintain HPC kinds are natural or intrinsic (e.g., biological) 
properties of the kind in question. This position speaks to an outstanding issue in the HPC kinds 
literature regarding whether the causal mechanisms underwriting HPC kinds are intrinsic or 
relational mechanisms. Philosophers of biology who have discussed HPC kinds in connection 
with species have emphasized the importance of relational mechanisms (e.g., interbreeding with 
conspecifics, phylogenetic relations, exposure to similar environments) that maintain the stability 
of property clusters associated with a species (Boyd 1999a, Millikan 1999, Wilson 1999, Wilson, 
Barker, and Brigandt 2007, Ereshefsky 2017). Some (e.g., Griffiths 1999, Okasha 2002, LaPorte 
2004) suggest that the cluster of properties associated with species can be explained exclusively 
in terms of relational properties (e.g., being a descendant of an ancestor, interbreeding with 
conspecifics), while others (e.g., Boyd 1999a, Wilson 1999, Devitt 2008, 2010) insist that some 
                                                 
distinction, I would challenge them to provide an example of a purely socially constituted human classification that 
yields ampliative and robust projectable inferences. In conversation, Stephen Turner has suggested that 
classifications from the Caste system might be a counterexample. I do not regard this as a counterexample to my 
distinction, but an example of a causally significant social classification system that is deeply entrenched within 
Indian culture. Projectable inferences that can be drawn from Caste level distinctions (e.g., higher Caste members 
tend to be wealthier than lower Caste members) are ultimately contingent; but they have remained stable over time 
because there are formal and informal social rules and norms (e.g., job discrimination against lower Caste levels) 
that support the stability of these inferences. My position is that a relevant change in the social environment would 
render these inferences invalid. By contrast, robust projectable inferences that are underwritten by stable biological 
mechanisms will remain invariant or stable—in a Woodwardian sense (Woodward 2000)—across different and 
changing social environments. 
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intrinsic properties (e.g., genetic properties) are necessary.9 The argument of this paper suggests 
that in order to yield robust projectable inferences, a classification needs to individuate some 
intrinsic properties. It is these intrinsic (biological) mechanisms that are shared by members of a 
kind, which explain the projectability of scientific classifications. In this regard, it is important to 
clarify two distinctive roles that causal mechanisms play in the theory of HPC kinds: 
1) From a metaphysical standpoint, they fix the stability of natural classes and explain 
the unity (‘homeostasis’) of the properties that are used to identify kinds and its 
members.   
2) From an epistemological standpoint, they ground the stability or invariance of 
projectable generalizations made about such kinds. 
While relational mechanisms can address (1), they will be insufficient to address (2). This is 
because relational mechanisms, such as interbreeding with conspecifics or phylogenetic 
relationships, are too general to provide specific inferences about members of a particular 
species (cf. Devitt 2008: 352-353). For projectable inferences about members of a species to be 
drawn, a kind term needs to individuate some intrinsic properties of the kind in question (e.g., 
genetic properties that explain the physiological and morphological features of a particular 
species). I support this general argument in the following section, where I aim to show that 
robust and ampliative projectable inferences yielded by some psychiatric classifications (e.g., 
                                                 
9 In responding to an argument by Millikan (1999) that species should be regarded as ‘historical kinds’ maintained 
by relational mechanisms (e.g., a copying process), Boyd (1999b: 81) emphasizes that species are HPC kinds 
underwritten by both intrinsic mechanisms (e.g., genetic properties, phenotypic traits) and relational (‘external’) 
mechanisms (e,g., historical relations). Devitt (2008, 2010) notes that—like his own essentialist account—HPC 
accounts of species that require some intrinsic mechanisms (e.g., Boyd 1999a, Wilson 1999) imply that species have 
‘partly intrinsic essences.’ 
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schizophrenia, bipolar disorder) are explained by the intrinsic (biological) mechanisms shared by 
members of a kind. 
As a qualification, it should be stated there is a sense in which the analysis of this paper 
and Mallon’s analysis are working at cross-purposes. My primary interest is to explain the 
(robust) projectability of human science categories, while Mallon’s primary interest is to explain 
how socially constructed categories can become causally significant in the sense that there are 
real and systematic causal differences associated with being a member of a constructed category. 
Throughout his discussion, Mallon frames his project as demonstrating how socially constructed 
categories can be causally significant (e.g., see Mallon 2016: 4, 8-10, 68-69); it might be the case 
that all that Mallon needs to do to establish this point is to show that these categories can yield 
contingent and transitory projectable inferences. If this is the case, then I would grant Mallon this 
point, but emphasize that there is a significant epistemological difference between the 
projectable inferences yielded by classifications of social kinds (transitory) and natural kinds 
(robust), respectively.  
 
 
4. Robust vs. Transitory Projectability: Some Examples 
The assumption motivating the argument in the previous section is that classifications of natural 
kinds yield stable ampliative projectable inferences because these classifications (to some extent) 
accurately individuate classes associated with a stable biological causal structure, i.e., a set of 
biological mechanisms that interact to cause various properties to cluster in a regular and non-
accidental manner. These projectable inferences are more robust and stable than projectable 
inferences drawn by classifications that individuate purely social kinds or the social constructs 
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discussed by Mallon. To support this argument, I present some examples of projectable human 
categories (e.g., PKU, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder) in the following section. These examples 
are intended to show that the robust ampliative projectable inferences that we can draw from 
these kind terms is due precisely to the fact that they individuate a natural kind underwritten by 
intrinsic biological mechanisms. Hence, the realist account offers a straightforward explanation 
of the projectability of some human science classifications: robust projectable generalizations are 
causal consequences of the common intrinsic (biological) properties shared by members of a 
kind. To support the idea that purely socially constituted kinds, like the social roles discussed by 
Mallon, cannot yield robust projectable inferences, but only transitory inferences, I discuss the 
example of the hysteria classification, which meets the general conditions specified by Mallon’s 
social role account, but does not yield any stable projectable inferences. These examples support 
the general conclusion that human science classifications that yield robust projectable inferences 
are classifications that individuate natural kinds. 
Consider the example of phenylketonuria (PKU), which is a rare recessive-gene disorder. 
The characteristic signs of PKU include a cluster of symptoms including: small head, prominent 
cheek and upper jaw bones with widely spaced teeth, poor development of tooth enamel, 
decreased body growth, and a mousy odor of the urine (Kring et al. 2007: 481-482). The 
symptoms of PKU are caused by an inherited lack of a liver enzyme, phenylalanine hydroxylase, 
which is needed to convert phenylalanine (an amino acid of food protein) to tyrosine (an amino 
acid that synthesizes proteins). When this enzyme is deficient, excessive phenylalanine builds up 
in the blood, which interferes with the myelination of neurons in the brain. When an infant with 
PKU eats foods containing phenylalanine, the brain fails to develop normally, resulting in severe 
mental retardation. Unlike other congenital disorders (e.g., Down syndrome), PKU is treatable. 
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Treatment of infants with PKU consists of placing them on a strict low-phenylalanine diet, which 
keeps phenylalanine levels in the blood low, allowing myelination to take place normally. Once 
myelination is complete, dietary restrictions can be removed since phenylalanine no longer 
threatens brain development. I maintain that the PKU classification refers to a biological kind 
insofar as the cluster of properties associated with PKU are constituted and maintained a set of 
stable (intrinsic) biological mechanisms and processes (e.g., genetic mechanisms, developmental 
mechanisms). In this example, notice that the PKU classification yields ampliative and 
scientifically useful projectable inferences (e.g., placing PKU infants on a low-phenylalanine diet 
will allow brain development to occur normally) precisely because we have knowledge about the 
biological mechanisms underwriting this category. Hence, the PKU classification yields stable 
projectable inferences because the classification accurately individuates a natural kind.  
One might object to my analysis by contending that PKU simply is a medical kind and 
that Mallon’s social role account is intended to capture more socially-robust ‘kinds of people’—
to borrow Ian Hacking’s (2007) phrase—that are constituted by folk-psychological social roles 
that are common knowledge in societies. To offer some examples that more obviously involve 
social roles of this sort, I discuss schizophrenia and bipolar disorder below, on the assumption 
that the ‘schizophrenic’ and the ‘manic-depressive’ are putative examples of entrenched social 
roles or kinds of people.  
Schizophrenia is currently defined by a cluster of symptoms including: (1) delusions 
(e.g., persecutory, grandiose), (2) hallucinations (typically auditory), (3) disorganized thinking 
and speech, (4) disorganized or catatonic behavior, and (5) diminished emotional expression or 
low levels of motivation (American Psychiatric Association 2013: 87-88, 99). Symptoms (1) and 
(2) are referred to as the ‘positive symptoms’ of schizophrenia, while (3) and (4) are referred to 
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as ‘disorganized symptoms,’ and (5) are referred to as ‘negative symptoms.’ While research on 
the causes of schizophrenia is complex and controversial (e.g., see Kendler and Schaffner 2011), 
there is compelling evidence that the symptoms of schizophrenia are closely related to abnormal 
neurobiological processes (see Tsou 2012, 2017). According to the ‘dopamine theory of 
schizophrenia,’ excessive dopamine activity in the mesolimbic pathway—which projects from 
the midbrain in the ventral tegmentum to the nucleus accumbens—causes the positive symptoms 
of schizophrenia; while deficient dopamine activity in the mesocortical pathway— which 
projects from the ventral tegmental area to the prefrontal cortex—causes the negative symptoms 
associated with schizophrenia (Kring et al. 2007: 363-365). While this neurobiological theory is 
oversimplified and glosses over complexities (e.g., the role of glutamate), there is robust 
evidence that the cluster of symptoms associated with the schizophrenia classification are 
constituted by a set of stable biological mechanisms. For the purposes of this paper, it is 
important to notice that robust ampliative projectable inferences (e.g., inferences regarding 
treatment) can be drawn from the schizophrenia classification precisely because the cluster of 
properties associated with the schizophrenia classification are underwritten by a set of intrinsic 
neurobiological mechanisms. For example, we can reliably predict that individuals exhibiting the 
positive (or psychotic) symptoms of schizophrenia will benefit from dopamine antagonist drugs 
that decrease dopamine activity in the mesolimbic pathway on the assumption that the 
schizophrenia classification accurately picks out a biological kind.  
 Bipolar disorder—of which ‘bipolar I disorder’ represents the modern classification of 
the manic-depressive classification advanced in the nineteenth century—is defined by a cluster 
of symptoms including the presence of at least one manic episode (defined by inflated self-
esteem, decreased need for sleep, flight of ideas, distractibility, increase in goal-directed activity, 
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and excessive involvement in risky behaviors) and typically involves the cycling between manic 
and depressive episodes (American Psychiatric Association 2013: 123-129). Bipolar disorder is a 
particularly interesting case since research on the biological causes of bipolar disorder are 
equivocal, despite the fact that there is a known effective pharmacological treatment, viz., 
lithium treatment. While the biological causes of bipolar disorder are unclear, research suggests 
that bipolar disorder is best understood as a family of similar but subtly different conditions, 
whose symptoms are maintained by the dysfunction of interconnected brain networks. Biological 
processes implicated in bipolar disorder include loss of volume in brain areas known to be 
involved in mood regulation (i.e., the amygdala, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, and ventral 
anterior cingulate cortex) and cognitive control (i.e., the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), dysregulation of glial-neuronal 
interactions at the cellular level (e.g., overactive microglia), and increased inflammation in the 
periphery of the body (Maletic and Raison 2014). The details of the biological mechanisms 
involved in bipolar disorder are less important than the assumption that there are underlying 
biological mechanisms that interact to regularly produce the cluster of symptoms associated with 
the bipolar classification. If this assumption is correct, then the category of bipolar disorder 
yields stable projectable inferences (e.g., bipolar patients can be treated with lithium) because of 
the intrinsic biological mechanisms that maintain its cluster of symptoms.  
 The examples of PKU, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder are intended to illustrate that 
the projectability of human science classifications can quite naturally be explained by the realist 
account that some human classifications (to some degree) accurately individuate biological 
kinds. In these examples, the classifications yield projectable inferences because the cluster of 
properties individuated by these classifications are caused by a set of stable natural (i.e., 
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biological) mechanisms shared by members of a kind. While Mallon’s preferred social role 
account of human kinds offers a plausible ‘how possibly’ model of how human kinds—
conceived of as social kinds—are projectable, the realist (or biological) account of human kinds 
provides a more compelling and parsimonious account of the projectability of human categories. 
Mallon’s social role account might explain how human kind classifications like schizophrenia or 
bipolar disorder yield non-ampliative projectable inferences (e.g., schizophrenics will report 
hearing voices, manic-depressives will experience rapid shifts of mood); however, it fails to offer 
a clear explanation of how these human categories can yield robust ampliative projectable 
inferences (e.g., the psychotic episodes of schizophrenics can be treated with dopamine 
antagonist drugs). On the realist account, these inferences are possible precisely because the 
category accurately picks out intrinsic (biological) properties that ground the category.  
To see why Mallon’s social role account is insufficient to explain the projectability of 
socially constructed human kinds, consider the classification of hysteria as it emerged in the late 
nineteenth century. Hysteria offers an example that fits nicely with the general account of social 
construction and social roles articulated by Mallon, yet it is a classification that did not yield any 
robust projectable inferences in the long term. Since the classical antiquity period, hysteria was 
characterized by symptoms such as convulsions, spasmodic seizures, and feelings of 
strangulation; by the nineteenth century, other symptoms were added, including fainting and 
swooning, paralysis of the limbs, anaesthesias, and trancelike states (Goldstein 1989: 323-324). 
Around the 1880s in France, there was a dramatic increase in recorded cases of hysteria, which 
gradually declined during the twentieth century to its virtual disappearance by the 1980s (Micale 
1993). During its heyday in late nineteenth-century France, hysteria satisfied the general 
conditions specified by Mallon’s account of human kinds. There were many representations of 
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hysteria (e.g., theories, models, narrative, pictures), which reinforced a common stereotype about 
hysteria (e.g., it is a neurological condition, typically afflicting females, caused by past trauma). 
Moreover, the public broadcasting about this social role—e.g., Charcot’s lectures at the 
Salpêtrière that featured the treatment of hysterical patients with hypnosis and popular depictions 
of hysteria in paintings and photographs—rendered the hysteria role common knowledge. There 
are multiple social mechanisms that maintained and entrenched this social role. For example, 
looping effects inevitably played a role in structuring the expectations and behavior of both those 
labelled as hysteric and the users of that label. Moreover, the kinds of implicit incentives (e.g., 
patients being reinforced for complying with psychiatrists’ expectations) discussed by labelling 
theorists (e.g., Scheff 1966) also functioned to entrench this social role. There were also 
environmental mechanisms (e.g., the institutional recognition of hysteria by doctors, the 
authoritative role of medicine and neurology, the presence of hospitals for mentally-disturbed 
women) that entrenched the hysteria role. Despite its entrenchment, the hysteria classification 
failed to yield long-term robust projectable inferences, which led to the demise of this category 
when it eventually split into several separate categories (e.g., ‘conversion disorder,’ 
‘somatization disorder,’ ‘histrionic personality disorder’). On the analysis suggested herein, the 
reason why the hysteria classification failed to yield robust projectable inferences is because the 
category failed to accurately individuate a biological kind.  
What is missing from Mallon’s account is an explicit position regarding the extent that 
human kinds must be grounded in natural (e.g., biological) properties. Mallon is officially neutral 
on this issue. In contrasting his account to Ásta’s ‘conferralist’ account of social construction 
(Sveinsdόttir 2013)—which suggests that category membership is solely determined by being 
classified or conferred as a member of that category in a certain context—Mallon (2016) states 
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that his own account maintains that “membership in a category … consists in possession of some 
sufficient cluster of properties that  may include putatively natural properties … , being 
classified by practices … , or the consequences of such ascriptive practices” (212, emphasis 
added). Mallon (2016) elaborates on this neutral position: 
[M]y account is neutral with regard to the constituting or metaphysical grounding 
properties for a category … I hold that the relevant homeostatic property-cluster … 
which constitutes membership in a particular human category is to be determined a 
posteriori by investigation into the features that explain whatever phenomena ground 
[the] use of the term. In this vein, as I consider the construction of social categories like 
race and gender, it seems important to me not to exclude in advance the possibility of 
partial construction, that is, the possibility that some actually natural properties figure 
alongside social roles and their consequences in grounding some categories. (212-213, 
emphasis added) 
Mallon’s (2016) explicit consideration of ‘partial construction’ (cf. Gannett 2010) and inclusion 
of natural (or intrinsic) properties as possible grounding properties for human categories conflicts 
somewhat with the way that he articulates his account in other parts of his book (e.g., see chaps. 
3, 8). Regardless, if Mallon is to offer a satisfactory account of the projectability of constructed 
human categories, he cannot remain neutral on this issue. As I have argued, the robust 
projectability of human kinds is entirely dependent on such categories accurately individuating 
natural (intrinsic) properties shared by members of a kind. Without appeal to such natural 
properties, Mallon’s account cannot persuasively explain how human kinds yield stable and 
ampliative projectable inferences. At the very least, the realist account of human kinds offers a 
superior explanation compared to the social role account.  
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5. Conclusion  
In this paper, I argued that Mallon’s explanation of the projectability of socially constructed 
human categories needs to be qualified insofar as it fails to distinguish between transitory and 
robust projectable inferences. While the social kinds articulated in Mallon’s account may yield 
transitory projectable inferences, they will not yield the robust and stable ampliative inferences 
demanded of social science classifications that aim to be predictive. The more orthodox realist 
view that human classifications yield projectable inferences when they individuate natural or 
biological kinds offers a more persuasive explanation for the robust projectability of some 
classifications. One way of expressing this argument is that Mallon’s reconciliation of social 
constructionism with naturalism is not realist enough insofar as it fails to sufficiently 
acknowledge a (realist) distinction between the projectable inferences yielded by classifications 
(e.g., ‘hysteria’) that are exclusively constructed by human representations and those (e.g., 
‘bipolar disorder’) that correspond to a set of biological properties shared by members of that 
class.  
Although I presented Mallon’s account in terms of social roles producing social kinds 
and the realist account that I favor in terms of categories individuating biological kinds, this 
simplified distinction was articulated for purposes of clarity and convenience. Most of the 
interesting projectable categories and kinds posited in the human and social sciences are classes 
inevitably constituted by both biological and social mechanisms. To offer a more compelling 
explanation of the projectability of human categories, Mallon’s social role analysis needs to take 
into account more directly the (intrinsic) biological properties that can both ground various 
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human kinds and explain the similarity relations among members of that kind. The partial 
construction account of social construction entertained by Mallon offers a promising path 
towards a more comprehensive account of the projectability of human categories. The 
psychiatric categories discussed in this paper can be instructive in this regard (cf. Kleinman 
1988: chs. 2-3; Tsou 2007: 339). The analysis of this paper suggests that the biological 
mechanisms individuated by a classification (e.g., ‘schizophrenia’) are responsible for producing 
a core cluster of characteristic signs (e.g., delusions, hallucinations). If a human category 
accurately individuates a biological kind, we can expect this core set of properties—and 
projectable inferences yielded by the general category—to remain stable over time. Social 
mechanisms (e.g., broadcasting of social roles, looping effects, role adoption) that function to fix 
criteria for a classification (e.g., ‘hysteria’) can be understood as social forces that can potentially 
stabilize a more local or culturally-sanctioned expression of these core signs (e.g., depression is 
expressed more in terms of somatic symptoms in China compared to Western countries). While 
these social mechanisms can undoubtedly contribute to establishing local and transitory 
projectable inferences, it is the accurate identification of biological mechanisms and kinds that 
allows for robust projectable inferences. Among investigations into the mechanisms that 
contribute to the property clusters associated with human categories, those that distinguish the 
contributions of biological mechanisms from social mechanisms—and explore how these 
mechanisms interact—merit further attention. 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
Acknowledgments 
I am grateful to Ron Mallon, Trevor Pearce, Rob Wilson, Catherine Kendig, P. D. Magnus, 
Carlos Santana, Stephen Biggs, Ranpal Dosanjh, Mark Risjord, Stephen Turner, Catherine 
Greene, Samuel Fletcher, Mengwen Zhang, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments 
and discussion. Drafts of this paper were presented at the Philosophy of Science Association 
meeting in Seattle in November 2018; the Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable at the 
University of Vermont in April 2019; and the Asian Conference on the Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences at Nankai University in June 2019. I thank the participants of these conferences for 
feedback and criticism. 
 
 
 
References 
 
American Psychiatric Association. 2013. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,  
5th ed.: DSM-5. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. 
Antony, Louise. 2003. “Who’s Afraid of Disjunctive Properties?” Noûs 37 (Supplement:  
Philosophical Issues 13): 1–21. 
Block, Ned. 1997. “Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back.” Noûs 31 (Supplement: Philosophical  
Perspectives 11): 107–132. 
Bird, Alexander, and Emma Tobin. 2018. “Natural Kinds.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of  
Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/natural-kinds/  
Boyd, Richard. 1985. “Observations, Explanatory Power, and Simplicity: Toward a Non – 
Humean Account.” In Observation, Experiment, and Hypothesis in Modern Physical  
Science, edited by Peter Achinstein and Owen Hannaway, 47–94. Cambridge, MA: MIT  
Press. 
Boyd, Richard. 1991. “Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds.” 
Philosophical Studies 61 (1–2): 127–148. 
Boyd, Richard. 1999a. “Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa.” In Species: New  
Interdisciplinary Essays, edited by Robert A. Wilson, 141–186. Cambridge, MA: MIT  
Press. 
Boyd, Richard. 1999b. “Kinds, Complexity, and Multiple Realization: Comments on Millikan’s  
‘Historical Kinds and the Special Sciences.’” Philosophical Studies 95 (1–2): 67–98.  
Boyd, Richard. 2010. “Realism, Natural Kinds, and Philosophical Methods.” In The Semantics  
and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, edited by Helen Beebee and Nigel Sabbarton-Leary,  
212–234. New York: Routledge. 
27 
 
Craver, Carl F. 2009. “Mechanisms and Natural Kinds.” Philosophical Psychology 22 (5): 575– 
594. 
Devitt, Michael. 2008. “Resurrecting Biological Essentialism.” Philosophy of Science 75 (3):  
344–382. 
Devitt, Michael. 2010. “Species Have (Partly) Intrinsic Essences.” Philosophy of Science 77  
(5): 648–661. 
Dupré, John. 1993. The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of  
Science. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
Dupré, John. 2001. “In Defence of Classification.” Studies in History and Philosophy of  
Biology and the Biomedical Sciences 32 (2): 203–219. 
Ereshefsky, Marc. 2017. “Species.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017  
Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta.  
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/species/  
Fodor, Jerry A. 1974. “Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working  
Hypothesis).” Synthese 28 (2): 97–115. 
Gannett, Lisa. 2010. “Questions Asked and Unasked: How by Worrying Less about the  
‘Really Real’ Philosophers of Science Might Better Contribute to Debates about Genetics  
and Race.” Synthese 177 (3): 363–385. 
Goldstein, Jan E. (1989). To Console and Classify: The French Psychiatric Profession in the  
Nineteenth Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Godman, Marion. 2013. “Psychiatric Disorders Qua Natural Kinds: The Case of the ‘Apathetic  
Children’.” Biological Theory 7 (2): 144–152. 
Griffiths, Paul E. 1997. What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Griffiths, Paul E. 1999. “Squaring the Circle: Natural Kinds with Historical Essences.” In  
Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, edited by Robert A. Wilson, 208–228.  
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Griffiths, Paul E. 2001. “Emotion and the Problem of Psychological Categories”, In Emotions,  
Qualia, and Consciousness, edited by Alfred W. Kaszniak, 28–41. Singapore: World  
Scientific. 
Hacking, Ian. 1991. “A Tradition of Natural Kinds.” Philosophical Studies 61 (1–2): 109–126. 
Hacking, Ian. 1995. “The Looping Effects of Human Kinds.” In Causal Cognition: A  
Multidisciplinary Debate, edited by Dan Sperber, David Premack, and Ann J. Premack,  
351–383. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Hacking, Ian. 1999. The Social Construction of What? Harvard, MA: Harvard University  
Press. 
Hacking, Ian. 2007. “Kinds of People: Moving Targets.” Proceedings of the British Academy  
151: 285–318. 
Haslanger, Sally. 2012. Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press. 
Kendler, Kenneth S., and Kenneth F. Schaffner. 2011. “The Dopamine Hypothesis of  
Schizophrenia: An Historical and Philosophical Analysis. Philosophy, Psychiatry, &  
Psychology 18 (1): 41–63. 
Kendler Kenneth S., Peter Zachar, and Carl Craver. 2011. “What Kinds of Things Are  
Psychiatric Disorders?” Psychological Medicine 41 (6): 1143–1150. 
Khalidi, Muhammad Ali. 2013. Natural Categories and Human Kinds: Classification in the  
28 
 
Natural and Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kim, Jaegwon. 1992. “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.” Philosophy and  
Phenomenological Research 52 (1): 1–26. 
Kleinman, Arthur. 1988. Rethinking Psychiatry: From Cultural Category to Personal  
Experience. New York: The Free Press. 
Kring, Ann M., Gerald C. Davison, John M. Neal, and Sheri L. Johnson. 2007. Abnormal  
Psychology, 10th ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 
LaPorte, Joseph. 2004. Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press. 
Maletic, Vladimir, and Charles Raison. 2014. “Integrated Neurobiology of Bipolar Disorder.”   
Frontiers in Psychiatry 5: 98. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4142322/  
Mallon, Ron. 2016. The Construction of Human Kinds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Micale, Mark S. 1993. “On the ‘Disappearance’ of Hysteria: A Study in the Clinical  
Deconstruction of a Disorder.” Isis 84 (3): 496–526. 
Millikan, Ruth G. 1999. “Historical Kinds and the ‘Special Sciences.’” Philosophical Studies 95  
(1–2): 45–65. 
Okasha, Samir. 2002. “Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and the Question of Essentialism.”  
Synthese 131 (2): 191–213. 
Perreault, Charles. 2012. “The Pace of Cultural Evolution.” PLoS One 7(9): e45150.  
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3443207/ 
Richerson, Peter J., and Robert Boyd. 2005. Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed  
Human Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Richerson, Peter J., Robert Boyd, and Joseph Henrich. 2010. “Gene-Culture Coevolution in the  
Age of Genomics.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States  
of America 107 (Suppl 2): 8985–8992. 
Scheff, Thomas J. 1966. “The Role of the Mentally Ill and the Dynamics of Mental Disorder: A  
Research Framework.” Sociometry 26 (4): 436–453. 
Slater, Matthew H. 2015. “Natural Kindness.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66  
(2): 375-422. 
Sveinsdóttir, Ásta K. 2013. “The Social Construction of Human Kinds.” Hypatia 28 (4): 716– 
732. 
Tsou, Jonathan Y. 2007. “Hacking on the Looping Effects of Psychiatric Classifications: What Is  
an Interactive and Indifferent Kind?” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science  
21 (3):  329–344. 
Tsou, Jonathan Y. 2012. “Intervention, Causal Reasoning, and the Neurobiology of Mental  
Disorders: Pharmacological Drugs as Experimental Instruments.” Studies in History and  
Philosophy of the Biological and Biomedical Science 43 (2): 542–551. 
Tsou, Jonathan Y. 2013. “Depression and Suicide are Natural Kinds: Implications for Physician- 
Assisted Suicide.” International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 36 (5–6): 461–470. 
Tsou, Jonathan Y. 2016. “Natural Kinds, Psychiatric Classification, and the History of the  
DSM.” History of Psychiatry 27 (4): 406–424. 
Tsou, Jonathan Y. 2017. “Pharmacological Interventions and the Neurobiology of Mental  
Disorders.” In The Physics of the Mind and Brain Disorders: Integrated Neural Circuits  
Supporting the Emergence of the Mind, edited by Ioan Opris and Manuel F. Casanova,  
327–367. Cham: Springer. 
Wilson, Robert A. 1999. “Realism, Essence, and Kind: Resuscitating Species Essentialism?” In  
29 
 
Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, edited by Robert A. Wilson, 187–207.  
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Wilson, Robert A., Matthew J. Barker, and Ingo Brigandt. 2007. “When Traditional  
Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds.” Philosophical Topics 35 (1–2): 189–215.  
Zachar, Peter. 2008. “Real Kinds but No True Taxonomy: An Essay in Psychiatric Systematics.”  
In Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology,  
edited by Kenneth S. Kendler and Joseph Parnas, 327–367. Baltimore, MD: John  
Hopkins Press. 
 
 
